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1 INTRODUCTION  
This paper critically analyses the legal and institutional framework set up by the Portuguese government in 
2004 to boost ‘urban requalification’ – the Urban Rehabiliation Societies (SRUs) – and its implementation 
in the city of Porto. Firstly, we present a diachronic analysis that identifies phases of continuity and change 
in models of urban requalification in Portugal. Secondly, we present the background for the SRU model 
and discuss the context in which it was implemented in Porto. Thirdly, based upon a qualitative 
methodology, which uses literature reviews, analysis of political documents, and six semi-structured face-
to-face interviews conducted with local and government officials, we analyse practices of urban 
requalification3 within a specific urban requalification operation, in the Cardosas quarter, which is an 
example of a large-scale requalification operation promoted by the Porto Vivo SRU in a context of public-
private partnership.  
Discussion of the results of this operation contributes to the debate on the criteria for evaluating the 
success of urban requalification projects from both processual and substantive perspectives vis-à-vis their 
effects on families and neighbourhoods. A set of research questions was formulated with this purpose in 
mind:  
- How have urban requalification strategies and goals been defined in the context of a neoliberal 
model which was implemented in a time of crisis and what role did partnerships with private 
actors play in that definition?  
- What groups were targeted by the requalification projects and, regarding housing, were there 
affordability concerns that protected less affluent populations from increasingly hostile conditions 
for middle class families in the historic centre of Porto?  
- Were the local population’s interests and local heritage considered in strategies and 
implementation, especially in large systematic operations such as the Cardosas?  
- To what extent did the Cardosas operation contribute to gentrification dynamics and to the 
explosive growth of tourism-related activities in the historic centre of Porto?  
 
2 THEORY  
Several studies have shown that the impact of rent regulation in the private rental sector varies greatly 
between countries and regions (see, for example, Moore & Dumming, 2017; Andersen, 2012, and Oxley, 
et al. 2011). They also have shown that reform of the first generation of rent control has followed different 
paths in different countries. In countries with strong state-led social welfare traditions, such as Germany, 
first-generation rent control has been replaced by softer rent controls complemented by incentives, such 
as tax concessions and direct subsidies to private landlords to provide housing at sub-market levels and 
means-tested housing subsidies to families. Meanwhile, in countries dominated by neoliberal ideas reform 
of first-generation rent regulation, which is associated with security of tenure (including protection from 
eviction), but also low rents and problems of maintenance, has led to deregulation and urban 
requalification subsidies which are not tied to conditions (e.g. the definition of lower prices or lower rents), 
leading to cycles of boom and bust (see Ball, 2016).  
Scrutinizing the relation between urban requalification and systems of rent control and tenancy law, Altes 
(2016) notes that, whilst rules that protect tenants from rising rents may result in under-investment and the 
misallocation of housing, deregulation of rent control and tenant protection (against forced relocation) can 
lead to over-investment in real estate, make it more difficult for new households to enter the housing 
market as rents generally rise faster than incomes.  
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National and local housing policies are important to stimulate housing requalification but also to shape the 
effects of requalification on housing costs, the control of rent increases for sitting tenants, and to 
counteract speculation so that median and low-income groups are not denied housing opportunities in 
areas of high demand. These groups are increasingly affected due to the contemporary pressure on real 
estate markets brought about by financialization, which produces urban (re)development where real estate 
is treated as a ‘financial asset’ and investment locations are chosen according to its perceived return rate 
(Loon & Aalbers, 2017).  
Local governance is a key intermediary in such processes, as public actors are playing the role of 
facilitators in the creation of financial assets (see Loon & Aalbers, 2017, pp. 222) The analysis of 
objectives that guide national and local policies, specifically political instruments that used to stimulate 
urban requalification and the way they filter external factors such as globalized finance or tourism, affecting 
the characteristics of national and local housing markets, is therefore crucial for those concerned with the 
transformation of cities.  
  
3 GENERAL BACKGROUND 3.1. URBAN DECLINE OF PRIVATE RENTAL 
SECTOR AND INNER CENTRES IN PORTUGAL  
Degradation, loss of resident population, and a growing number of vacant buildings have been severe 
problems in Portuguese city centres for the last decades. According to the 2011 Census, about a million 
buildings throughout Portugal are in need of repair and of these about 400,000 require significant works, 
with a greater concentration in city centres. In the case of the historic centre of Porto, where there is a total 
of 1800 buildings, about 34% were in poor or very poor condition, requiring deep interventions, and 
another 51% required small and medium-scale repair (Census 2011). Regarding the occupation of 
buildings, it is estimated that 19% of all buildings were vacant in the municipality of Porto in 2011. 
Accordingly, between 1991 and 2011, the population of the historic centre fell from 20,342 to 9,334 
individuals, a loss of about half of the total resident population (Census, 2011).  
The private rental sector decreased abruptly in Portugal between 1981 and 2011, from 40% to 20%, a 
reduction from 1,074,590 to 545,710 dwellings (Census, 2011). In the municipality of Porto, between 1981 
and 2011, the private rental sector decreased from 67,373 to 43,302 dwellings.  
In 2011, in Portugal 19% of total rent contracts were established before 1975, 34% between 1975 and 
2005, and 47% between 2006 and 2011. Evidence shows that pre-1990 contracts are characterized by low 
rents. Moreover, about 15% of all rented accommodation in Portugal in 2011 still carried rents equal, or 
less than, 35 euros per month, where often senior tenants live with poor housing conditions
1
. In Porto half 
of a total of 43,302 private rental dwellings, equivalent to 21,084 have rents below 100 euros. Contrarily, 
the segment of contracts signed after 1990 is increasingly dominated by higher rents, due to a high 
demand from tourism activities, which has raised issues of affordability and tenant security from middle 
and low incomes families. In the historical Porto, after a period of stagnation that followed the 2008 global 
economic crisis, when the availability of credit was problematic, between 2010 and 2014, real estate sale 
prices increased 50% and by the end of 2014 rehabilitated dwellings had an average value of 2,370€/m2 
(Porto Vivo SRU, 2014: 86).  
 
3.2 URBAN REQUALIFICATION IN PORTUGAL AND IN PORTO  
Legal changes in rent regulation (Law 31/2012) have been implemented with the aim of reversing the 
effects of decades of rent freeze. The 2012 new Urban Lease Act Law, aiming to implement the full 
                                                          
1
 It is worth noting that rent controls were first introduced in Portugal in 1910, but the freezing of all private sector rents 
was not implemented in Lisbon and Porto until 1948. With the revolution of 1974, in a context of economic recession 
and housing shortages, the freezing of rents was extended throughout Portugal. These rules allowed sitting tenants to 
remain in their houses without incurring increased housing costs and, owing to inflation, rents become almost symbolic, 
namely, designed for tenants of middle incomes who had hitherto paid very low rents. Because property owners have 
not traditionally made enough money for maintenance or renovation and tenants could not be evicted, the vast 
proportion of older housing stock has suffered dilapidation. 
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liberalisation of the rental market, set a five-year period of transition from the old (prior to 1990) lease 
contracts to a new regime of rents (free of rent control mechanisms), with the exception for low-income 
tenants or those with disabilities, where the rent increases should be compensated by housing allowances 
paid by the state. It was expected that full liberalisation accompanied by a new rent subsidy scheme, 
would come into effect in 2017, but the left-wing government increased the transition period by another five 
years.  
Over time, several programmes have attempted to boost the renovation of the private rental sector building 
stock, being possible to identify different phases, in terms of strategies, instruments, and implementation. 
Two main phases of national policy for urban requalification can be identified: i) from 1986 until 2000, an 
approach that targeted private rented dwellings with old contracts and poor housing standards, and 
gradually adopted an integrated approach that aimed to combine small-scale housing interventions with 
social equipment, patrimony and cultural valorisation,; ii) from 2000 onwards, a neoliberal approach 
focused on public-private partnership to leverage private investment and generate trickle-down effects. 
The latter involved the creation of public-private partnerships to allow economic revitalization and 
operations of housing requalification, the Urban Requalification Societies (SRU, in the Portuguese 
acronym).  
The first national framework for urban requalification was created when Portugal entered the European 
Union in 1986, the access to funds of the Community Support Framework enabled an important expansion 
of national investment in urban requalification, in matters of public space, slum clearance and the 
conservation of historic monuments and sites, but not of housing requalification, which was then 
considered a responsibility of national member states (Alves, 2017a).  
The ‘Programme of Urban Requalification’ launched at this time by the central government in partnership 
with local authorities, aimed at the requalification of private rented buildings and involved two main 
instruments, one technical/ institutional and the other financial.  
The first provided funding for the creation of Gabinetes Técnicos Locais (GTL) Local Technical that hired 
architects, engineers, sociologists, social workers, etc. in an attempt to support local municipalities in 
efforts of urban requalification, namely of historic centres Costa (2010: 398). When government financing 
ceased, many of the GTLs, whose activity was structured around social objectives and bottom-up 
approaches, became local municipal offices.  
The second enabled the creation of a list of programmes of housing requalification that targeted private 
rented dwellings with old contracts and poor housing standards. In particular, the RECRIA (acronym for 
Special Reimbursement Scheme for the Recovery of Leased Property), and more recently the REHABITA 
(acronym for Regime to Support Housing Recovery in Ancient Urban Areas provided funding for landlords 
- to support the upgrading and maintenance of buildings and sitting tenants – and for tenants - housing 
allowances to cover the rent increases following housing requalification. In some municipalities, municipal 
housing services provided housing for the temporary relocation of sitting tenants during the periods of 
housing requalification, which was considered a great incentive for landlords to rehabilitate their properties. 
In the case of RECRIA, access to funding was conditional on the existence of at least one tenant in the 
building with a pre-1980 contract (i.e. with frozen rent values). However, the execution rate of this 
programme was lower than anticipated, since it demanded about 40% matching funds from the 
municipalities’ own budget. Except for programme REHABITA, which targeted areas mainly coinciding with 
historic centres, the national programmes of requalification were not tailored for city centre needs. They 
were simply targeted to individual owners interested in carrying out maintenance/requalification in 
occupied buildings associated with old contracts and low rents.  
Whilst national policy for urban requalification in the 1990s focused upon critical areas and gradually 
adopted an integrated approach that aimed to combine small-scale housing interventions with social 
equipment, modest public projects, patrimony and cultural valorisation, the 2000s saw a significant policy 
shift. There was greater focus upon public spaces, cultural facilities, streetscaping, pedestrianization 
schemes, and urban refurbishment. Large events such as the 2001 Porto European Capital of Culture 
(Alves, 2017b) and POLIS (Baptista, 2013), created after the Lisbon World Exhibition of 1998, are clear 
examples of this.  
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More recently, the European Bank of Investment (EIB) has become one of the most relevant funding 
sources for urban requalification. In 2008, the Portuguese authorities and the EIB signed a Memorandum 
of Understanding  
for the application of the Joint European Support for Sustainable Investment in City Areas (JESSICA), 
which was deployed for country’s structural funding programme (ERDF) from 2007-2013. This instrument 
funded municipalities, SRU, banks, investment funds or private entities involved in urban regeneration 
projects. The national program ‘Partnerships for Urban Regeneration’, operationalized this strategy during 
the period 2009-2013, through initiatives that were supported the requalification of historic centres, critical 
neighbourhoods, and waterfronts. In the historical centre of Porto supported 2 interventions (see next 
section)  
In 2013, a new financial instrument using funds from the EIB was launched by IHRU for the requalification 
of buildings that are totally or partially occupied by sitting tenants with old contracts associated to low 
rents. It has a budget of around 50 million euros and is expected to induce both housing requalification and 
affordable rents. This was expected to capitalize on the effects of the new Urban Lease Act Law, which 
paved the way for greater flexibility in the renegotiation of open-ended residential leases between private 
landlords and tenants, by phasing out rent control mechanisms for old leases and imposing stricter limits 
on the possibility of transmitting the contract to first degree relatives.  
Porto urban requalification policy followed closely the national phases mentioned above.  
After the 25th April Revolution, in 1974, the state created a government agency, CRUARB
1
 to promote the 
requalification of the riverside front of Porto. Its mission was ensuring that the “working class population 
that inhabited that area for a long time, in the worst conditions of housing and exploitation” could remain in 
the area (Alfredo, 1997: 78). The goal was to avoid evicting the poor as a result of rising property values 
deriving from the requalification works.  
 
3.3 THE URBAN REQUALIFICATION SOCIETIES MODEL  
Over 30 years, with public funding only, first from the Housing Development Fund and from 1985 onward 
as a GTL, when government financing ceased and CRUARB became a municipality project, municipal 
funding and national or European competitive bids, the CRUARB agency developed a model that was 
based upon buying degraded properties, though negotiation or expropriation, and developing projects of 
engineering architecture to rehabilitate derelict buildings. The rehabilitated buildings were either sold or 
entered the social housing rent market, meaning they had rents below market values. In 1992 access to 
Poverty III funding created the Foundation for the Development of the Porto Historic Area (FDZHP) that 
with CRUARB promoted an integrated programme of actions that combined urban requalification with 
more immaterial dimensions of intervention, such as of training for unemployed, support for children, etc. 
(Alves, 2017b). In 2001, the preparation of the Porto European Capital of Culture event led to investments 
that were mostly focused upon “public spaces, streets, cultural facilities, streetscaping, pedestrianization 
schemes, and new urban furniture” (Balsas, 2007: 232).  
In 2004 the approval of new legislation concerning rent regulation and urban requalification led to the 
creation of the Urban Requalification Society (SRU) model. This institutional arrangement was based on 
the premise that, in order to tackle city centre requalification, local authorities need a lighter structure of 
governance and partnerships with national authorities and private actors. This model, that operates under 
a regime of exception providing the SRU with more entrepreneurial and discretionary processes of 
decision and delivery outside existing state bureaucracies, included the possibility of property restructuring 
and forced intervention through expropriation.  
The Urban Requalification Law (legal decree no. 103/2004) created two institutional models for these 
societies, one in which the municipalities hold all the capital, and another in which societies enjoy capital 
from the municipality and the central state. The second model was implemented only in Porto, Coimbra, 
and Viseu, all of which remain active to date.  
                                                          
1
 Portuguese acronym for Committee for the Urban Renovation of the Ribeira/Barredo Area.  
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The SRU model puts great emphasis on strategic planning. First of all, municipalities and SRUs enjoy 
substantial freedom to define their strategy of action and priority areas of intervention (called Urban 
Requalification Areas – ARU). In these areas, special benefits apply automatically regarding national taxes 
(Value Added Tax for requalification works), and local taxes (namely, property taxation). In addition, 
specific action programmes may be approved – Urban Requalification Operations, ORU – with concrete 
goals and requalification programmes to be executed by SRU directly or in partnership
1
.  
It is a competence of municipalities in coordination with SRUs to rank and coordinate the various goals of 
urban requalification from the strategic to the operational stages, which means that, for the first time, there 
is policy decentralization in behalf of municipalities.  
SRUs have the legal power to expropriate or force the sale of buildings that are in a poor state of repair 
with the aim of promoting their requalification, when all other options are excluded, considering that 
requalification is, in the first place, a duty of the owners, and the role of the SRU is primarily to enforce the 
duty. On the other hand, the legal status of the SRU model makes it easier to employ staff and contract 
commercial loans, and to implement faster licencing procedures, allegedly improving the cost-
effectiveness of urban requalification.  
Owing to austerity measures from 2009 onwards, tight debt controls were implemented in the 
municipalities and a rule enforcing financial sustainability for municipal companies was put into practice, 
leading to many SRU in small and medium cities being shut down and to strong pressure for financial 
sustainability. At the same time, changes in urban requalification laws in 2009 and 2012 introduced 
significant amendments to the SRU’s instruments of action. Funding schemes for housing requalification to 
be used by private owners were drastically reduced and replaced by tax reductions and tax benefits. 
These changes increased the need for municipalities and the SRU to engage in partnerships that would 
enable higher investment.  
  
4 PORTO VIVO SRU AND THE CASE OF THE CARDOSAS INTERVENTION  
This paper scrutinizes the SRU model, by looking at the city of Porto, where historic centre degradation 
were very severe by national standards and SRU implementation represented a drastic change in both 
governance and policy goals. The paper focuses on a particular Porto Vivo SRU intervention, designated 
Cardosas Operation, which is an interesting example of SRU strategies for two reasons. Firstly, it was 
identified in Porto Vivo SRU strategic documents as a priority intervention area or pilot intervention quarter, 
meaning that it qualified for flagship projects aimed at inducing requalification in neighboring buildings and 
surrounding quarters. Secondly, an innovative implementation mode was used, intending to test 
partnership models and inspire future actions. In effect, requalification was not led by private owners but 
by real-estate promoters with whom Porto Vivo SRU established partnership contracts. Porto Vivo 
assumed important investments in this operation, such as the acquisition of buildings (expropriated or 
negotiated purchases from private owners), demolitions and constructions, namely a square inside the 
quarter and an underground parking space.  
This project has generated strong controversy over the amount of public spending and goals of the 
intervention (supporting a luxury hotel and a high-end housing development), but also for the real-estate 
speculation that it generated, a result which is recognized by supporters as a sign of success and by critics 
as a negative effect. There was strong opposition also from academics and practitioners in the areas of 
architecture and conservation due to disregard of local heritage and the option to demolish many buildings 
and completely alter the quarter’s urban design.  
The research presented here is informed by two main sources of information. Firstly, upon qualitative 
documentary analysis, namely legislation, strategic documents, SRU execution reports, and a literature 
review on the topic. And secondly upon qualitative, semi-structured, face-to-face interviews with 
                                                          
1
 ORUs are approved by the executive and deliberative organs of the municipality and can be either simple ORUs (an 
integrated operation of urban requalification aimed main mostly at buildings) or systematic ORUs (which require a 
strategic programme and are aimed at both building requalification and qualification of infrastructures and public spaces 
and equipment). 
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staff/officials working in SRU (5), local authorities (2), and in the central institution responsible for housing 
policy (2). Interviews were conducted in Porto in 2015 and were later transcribed.  
Bearing in mind that, depending upon the goals of the evaluation, its research object, and methodology, 
different results and knowledge can derive from the evaluation process, we framed an evaluation matrix 
based on two main fields of analysis fields and several associated indicators to be studied and 
documented, where possible, with quantitative data. Essentially, the focus of the research is upon 
underlying strategic principles and assumptions behind governance and operational choices, modes of 
implementation and, finally, their direct effects in in the hosing and residents’ socio-economic profile (see 
Table 1).  
 
Table 1 – Analysis matrix  
  
4.1 THE IMPLEMENTATION OF URBAN REQUALIFICATION SOCIETIES IN PORTO  
Porto Vivo SRU was set up as a public capital company, where the central state (through the Institute for 
Housing and Urban Requalification, IHRU in the Portuguese acronym) owns 60% of the capital and the 
Porto municipality the remaining 40%. The creation of this company led to transference of competencies 
and resources from the municipality to the SRU. In terms of governance, this decision was preceded by a 
strategic study – the Porto Vivo SRU Masterplan - which delimited the historical centre as the main area of 
intervention by the SRU. By using statistical data and multivariate analysis techniques, the choice of the 
city centre was justified on two grounds: the high level of housing degradation and concentration of poverty 
and social exclusion in the historical neighbourhoods, and the existing economic opportunities related to 
tourism, heritage, and creativity.  
The Porto Vivo SRU Masterplan defined a strategy of requalification based upon two main strategic 
guidelines (Porto Vivo SRU, 2005): Re-population, through attracting new residents, and economic 
revitalization, through the promotion of activities related to commerce, culture, and leisure that benefit from 
the tourism dynamics, which in turn derive from Porto historic centre’s status as a UNESCO World 
Heritage site.  
In strategic terms, the historic centre of Porto was defined as an ARU (the so-called Urban Requalification 
Areas – ARU) in 2012, and within this area several blocks were identified as priority areas of intervention 
or pilot areas to guide future interventions. It was also expected that the concentration of public investment 
in these priority areas would generate trickle-down effects that would attract private investment to 
neighbouring areas, stimulating a wave of private investment that allowed for the requalification of the 
whole city centre.  
For each quarter targeted for priority intervention, strategic documents were drafted. In terms of strategies, 
instruments, and implementation, after more than 10 years of SRU intervention in the historic centre of 
Porto, we can identify three main types of intervention:  
1. Direct requalification of derelict buildings owned by the SRU and designated for housing. The 
rehabilitated dwellings have been either sold or placed on the rental market. It is interesting to 
note that those that have been rehabilitated for renting are located in a deprived area, the Morro 
da Sé neighbourhood, benefitting chiefly from a €7,5m loan granted by the European Investment 
Bank, which has enabled the requalification of 32 buildings. It is also interesting to note that, of all 
housing stock in Morro da Sé, 47% needed deep interventions, 23% medium interventions, while 
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only 4% were in suitable for use. Furthermore, due to expropriation processes throughout the 
1990s, 40% of all buildings was public property (SRU/municipality) and of these many were 
vacant or in poor condition. Of the total, before interventions by SRU, 80% of the buildings were 
already occupied by tenants and the remaining 20% by owners.  
2. Urban Requalification contracts with private partners (e.g. the Carlos Alberto intervention) or real 
estate funds (e.g. Cardosas and D. João II operations), where Porto Vivo SRU participated with 
the expropriation of buildings, rehousing of sitting tenants, demolition, cleaning etc. These were, 
by and large, ambitious and expensive real estate projects aimed at selling for profit (on average, 
1.900 euros/m2). The tenants who lived in the blocks where these operations took place were 
relocated to social housing districts or to Morro da Sé  
3. Direct physical requalification of public space aimed at inducing requalification by private owners. 
This is the case of the operation in Mouzinho-Flores, contiguous to the Cardosas operation, 
which was funded by a national programme paid for using structural funds and Partnerships for 
Urban Regeneration.  
  
4.2 THE CARDOSAS INTERVENTION  
The Cardosas quarter occupies 7,485 square metres and is located in a transition area between Praça da 
Liberdade/Aliados boulevard (where Porto town hall is located) and the historic Centre (Figure 1). The 
requalification strategy for the Cardosas quarter was detailed in a document approved in June 2007, but 
the decision to intervene and the general strategy was undertaken in 2005. The minutes of a meeting of 
the Administration Board of the Porto Vivo SRU date from 2005 and already describe the decision to 
develop an ambitious and systematic requalification operation that would involve the social, economic, and 
urban revitalization of the quarter. The goal of mixed-use occupation (housing, commerce, and services), 
with car parking to support future residents and activities, is clearly stated in that document.  
 
Figure 1 – Location of the Cardosas quarter in the Historic Centre of Porto  
  
4.2.1 STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE  
Drafted by a private consulting firm on behalf of Porto Vivo SRU, the Cardosas strategic document is 
structured in two parts. One describes the conditions before intervention, seeking to justify the need for a 
systematic intervention that targets a segment of the population with high purchasing power. The second 
details the strategy that must be followed to achieve this goal. Regarding the former, it states that prior 
intervention in the quarter there were 42 buildings with 92 owners. The document is, however, vague 
regarding characterization of the resident population. It states that six buildings were for housing purposes, 
but does not elucidate the number of residents, the number of families living there, or their specific needs. 
It also states that, 35% of the built area was used for commerce and services, and 15% was allocated to 
commercial storage.  
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The document defines a systematic strategy of requalification that aims to produce quality housing for a 
high- end market segment. Affordable housing at controlled costs and for rent is not envisaged for the 
quarter. With this purpose in mind, strategy has been drafted based on the following:  
− The demolition of the buildings inside the quarter (11 buildings) to create a public plaza and (see 
below) underground car parking;  
− The requalification of a historic palace overlooking Praça da Liberdade and a few minutes' walk 
from São Bento station, that became a luxury hotel
1
;  
− The restructuring of uses, promoting mixed use of qualified commerce and services on the 
ground floors and housing on the higher floors for new, and affluent segments of the population;  
− The alteration of the existing built structure to increase space available for housing and other 
activities (merging two or more buildings to create more spacious housing). While the general 
façade was maintained, the back (interior of the quarter) had been totally demolished and 
reconstructed.  
In a different section of the document, it is stated that the resident population will be relocated in other 
areas, without stating which, or the conditions thereof. It is clear, however, that the decision to displace 
and rehouse this population elsewhere relates to the understanding that they can afford the “higher 
standard” quality housing that will be provided there (SRU strategic document, 2007: 21). It is even stated 
that, as only a small proportion of the population live there, this will facilitate displacement and the success 
of the operation:  
“Another aspect to be considered […] relates to the fact that, currently, the quarter has virtually no resident 
population, therefore the introduction of a ‘new’ population will, in theory, introduce no significant social 
conflict factors.” (our translation) (Porto Vivo SRU, 2007: 24).  
The document also states that it is likely and desirable that the renovated dwellings will be sold as second 
houses or to private investors interested in tourism-related business, such as short-term rentals:  
“Excellent access to public transport, such as train, underground (qualified transports), and buses, may be 
an added factor of differentiation for this quarter, namely, for the segment which choses to have a second 
home in the city of Porto.” (our translation) (Porto Vivo SRU, 2007: 24).  
Whilst the strategic document recognizes the excellent access to public transport (metro and train station, 
bus), and the fact that alternative parks are available within 150m (Sequeira, 2011), the strategic 
document claims that a car park “is indispensable to make housing viable in the quarter”, due to the 
current demands of the affluent population that is expected to occupy the area, both as residents and hotel 
guests, which are typically car users. (Porto Vivo SRU, 2007: 25).  
Analysis of the strategic document reveals that it mainly proposes the need for deep intervention in the 
quarter based on evidence that it was underused
2
 and in a poor state of conservation
3
. The SRU 
proceeded to expropriate some block-front buildings and invested €13M in expropriation of the core of the 
block to gain possession of 22 buildings. In the case of other buildings with requalification needs that were 
not subject to "forced sale", contracts were drawn up between owners and the SRU for requalification 
promoted by the owners themselves. An equal percentage of buildings remained in good repair. It should 
be noted that the SRU’s Statement of Accounts for 2012 explains €7M of deficit by the high cost of 
expropriation, arrived at not by agreement with owners but by court decisions: “Judicial decisions in 
expropriation proceedings were above the amounts allocated in the framework of expert opinions 
requested by the SRU for this purpose.” (Porto Vivo SRU, 2012).  
In the case of the Cardosas operation, Porto Vivo SRU, as the project leader, assumed the costs of 
expropriation and demolition for park construction and public spaces, establishing a partnership with two 
private partners - Lúcio da Silva Azevedo e Filhos, S.A. (LUCIUS) and the InterContinental Hotels Group - 
for the requalification of Palácio das Cardosas. While LUCIUS was responsible for the construction, real 
estate development, and marketing of the housing, Intercontinental was responsible for the construction 
                                                          
1
 See https://www.ihg.com/intercontinental/hotels/gb/en/porto/prtha/hoteldetail  
2
 technical inspections report that 24% of the buildings were empty and only 28% were totally occupied 
3
 57% of the inspected buildings were in poor condition, 17% were average and 26% had a good conservation state 
 1847 
 
and hotel management (see Table 2 for details of the partnership roles). For the hotel project, a real estate 
investment fund - designated First Oporto Urban Regeneration Fund (4F) - was involved as a financial 
instrument to support the operation.  
The business plan of the Cardosas project, as submitted to JESSICA program for funding
1
, defined that i) 
all of the project’s construction and commercialization expenses are assumed by the private partner, and 
ii) the revenue obtained from the sale of commercial areas and houses is equally divided between the 
SRU and the private partner, while the amount received from the sale of the car park is almost all the 
private partner’s: “Porto Vivo SRU and Lúcio will each receive 50% sales of residential and commercial 
areas (about €7.9M). In addition, Lúcio will receive the amount relating to be car parking sale (€6.5M).” 
(Deloitte and Parque Expo, 2009: 46).  
The 4F began activity in June 2011, with an initial capital of €5M and acquired all the 40 buildings in the 
Quarteirão das Cardosas that were owned by LUCIUS, that is, buildings expropriated by Porto Vivo and 
transmitted to Lúcios, new buildings, however erected or under construction, inside the block intended for 
trade/services/equipment, parking, and possibly other real estate acquired by way of negotiations. (See 
Gaspar, 2014: 61-63).  
 
Table 2 – Public-private partnership structure for the Cardosas operation  
Adapted from: Sequeira (2011: 69), Jessica Evaluation Study, Gaspar (2014: 55-63).  
  
4.2.2 CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CARDOSAS OPERATION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SRU 
INTERVENTION  
Based upon nine semi-structured face-to-face interviews conducted in Lisbon and Porto at the beginning 
of 2015, we now aim to shed light upon how the SRU, local authorities, and the Institute of Housing and 
Urban Renewal (IHRU), that is, the government-run body responsible for supporting and implementing 
government housing policy in Portugal, assessed the Cardosas operation from the point of view of their 
impacts upon i) practices of urban governance (formal and informal relations between stakeholders within 
the municipality, across government levels, and in the context of public-private partnerships), and ii) on 
housing market dynamics (e.g. changes of tenure, rents etc.). The link between strategies of housing and 
urban requalification and issues of housing affordability for low- and middle-income families were broached 
when, for example, we asked about the impact of the operation on the provision of affordable rental 
housing (below market rates). Whilst some interviewees did not know in detail about the Cardosas 
operation, they were, however, familiar with the contents, methodologies, and purposes of the SRU model 
in one or more cities, which introduced new perspectives to the analysis.  
Of those interviewees who were familiar with the Cardosas intervention they all recognize that this 
generated a high deficit for the public partners (values mentioned vary from seven to nine million euros). 
This was due to a wrongful evaluation of the costs involved in the Porto Vivo SRU tasks. However, the 
interviewees presented different explanations of the reason for such high deficits. In one interview (PS3), 
the construction of the square was decided during the project and exceeded initial costs. Another 
interviewee (CG2), mentioned that expropriation costs were above the expected and Porto Vivo SRU 
                                                          
1
 he goal of JESSICA (Joint European Support for Sustainable Investment in City Areas) is to support institutional 
investors, namely, municipalities and Urban Requalification Societies, to invest in requalification funded by Real Estate 
Investment Funds. It is important, however, to note that projects to be eligible for funding, which have to be framed by 
"integrated sustainable urban development plans". 
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argued that this caused the deficit. Another criticism regarding financial management involved the sale of 
the park to a private company for a very low price (100 thousand €) (CG1).  
Because central government manages the majority of Porto Vivo SRU’s capital, it was expected that this 
deficit would be financed with additional public funding. This led to major conflicts between stock-holders 
and closer scrutiny of the conditions of partnerships in future projects (PS3). IHRU interviewees stated that 
this deficit was not expected, as financial studies of the project estimated that it would generate profit from 
the sale of apartments: “The model defined for that operation was expected to be profitable […] the State 
decided to go forward, I am convinced, because it was not a waste of money. It was, in a certain way, a 
loan.” (CG1).  
When looking at the operation globally, besides housing, the major project was a luxury hotel, interviewees 
alleged that “1 € of public spending generated 16 € of private investment” (PS1), and that housing sales 
were highly successful, indicating that private partners achieved their goals.  
In terms of the physical and social impacts of requalification, the Cardosas operation had several impacts 
regarding the transformation of the housing stock (e.g. tenures and typology structure, rent values), the 
state of conservation of the buildings, in some cases more renovation than requalification, economic 
revitalization of the area (with the creation of 19 commercial spaces), and changes in the residents’ socio-
economic profile, with the displacement of existing tenants (how many was not stated), and the attraction 
of 50 new luxury apartments (e.g. most one- or two- bedroom units). The sale of all new apartments at 
high prices indicates a transfer of tenure towards ownership but not necessarily for permanent use or 
permanent residents, but most for short rental. A high share of apartments is for short rental, as the 
transaction prices are not attractive for most families that showed an interest in the historical centre. (CG2) 
Interviewees who claimed the success of the Cardosas operation (PS1, PS2, PS3) argue that, from a 
commercial point of view, the operation as a whole was a success (PS1), showing that it targeted a type of 
demand that needed to be accommodated. When asked about the need for a more diverse social 
composition of the quarter, one interviewee argued that the inclusion of other social groups (low-income 
groups) is a fact in nearby quarters: “50m from the Cardosas we have the Morro da Sé” (PS3), a typical 
medieval district with narrow streets, difficult access and a concentration of derelict buildings, favouring 
traffic and drug use in some public plazas, associated with a bad reputation (Alves, 2017c). In the 
historical centre of Porto, rehabilitated housing for rental purposes provided by SRU for temporary or 
definitive relocations is concentrated in Morro da Sé, while some families are rehoused in social housing 
neighbourhoods.  
The transformation of the physical built environment was also the object of strong criticism, for several 
reasons: LG1 mentioned the rearrangement of parcels (fusions of small buildings to create larger housing 
units); the lack of respect for architectural heritage; the car-friendly strategy, and the privatization of open 
space in the quarter which was initially designed for public use. In the words of one interviewee: “In the 
end, all that was left was a scenario, a square that is not a square, a hotel solution that gives me the chills, 
so from my point of view it is something that cannot happen again.” (LG1).  
Porto Vivo SRU representatives justify the need for the closing of the inner square after 9pm to avoid 
security problems such as vandalism and the presence of marginal populations (PS1, PS2). There is an 
underlying concern to create a safe environment for new residents. Whilst it was mentioned that this 
situation may be reviewed after the opening of commercial spaces on the ground floors (PS1), this has not 
happened and the central plaza remains closed at night.  
  
5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS  
Housing dilapidation, poor housing conditions, and the decline of the private rented sector remain key 
challenges to historic Portuguese cities as the result of obsolete forms of rent control and housing policies 
focusing upon purchase rather than rental.  
The model of “Urban Rehabilitation Societies” was created in a context of neoliberal framing of the role of 
the state and it became fully operational in the early days of austerity enforcement. The discourse and 
rhetoric of this policy model is framed by cutbacks in instruments of direct public intervention and employs 
the view (both ideological and practical) that intervention must rely upon private investment. This is 
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apparent in the two main strategies set up by the central state to boost urban requalification, that is, the 
liberalization of rent markets, and the setting up of governance models that encourage public-private 
partnerships vis-à-vis quarter-based operations of urban/housing requalification, chiefly SRUs.  
Local authorities, which in the context of SRUs became key actors in the definition of strategies of urban 
and housing renewal, both in terms of the selection of priority areas for intervention, that is, the definition of 
goals that should guide intervention, and policy implementation, have been ‘steered’ towards polic ies 
designed to increase real-estate prices (Van Loon & Aalbers 2017).  
The Cardosas operation is an interesting case to illustrate the many pitfalls of this model of urban 
rehabilitation (e.g. governance, forced displacements, social-spatial income polarization), as it was 
promoted by Porto Vivo SRU, which is owned by the central state and Porto municipality, and diverged 
from the fundamental principles and goals of previous models (e.g. CRUARB) that aimed to promote 
housing rehabilitation for social purposes and promote a rental market accessible to the more vulnerable 
living in the city centre (Alves, 2017a).  
By funding deep restructuring of the Cardosas quarter, both in terms of urban design and the social 
composition of the area, [SRU] acted as intermediaries in the financialization of the real-estate market in 
Porto, reinforcing the income gaps between the poorest and the wealthiest neighbourhoods of this 
historical centre.  
The process is widely documented. The urban renewal operation of Cardosas transformed the mixed 
structure of the area, both in terms of population and economic activities, on which its historical identity is 
based, to offer the provision of new services and luxury housing affordable only for a few. Associated with 
architectural and infrastructural improvements and to territorial marketing, the urban renewal operation 
meant real estate prices rose and led to the expansion of property ownership. This was accompanied by 
forced displacements and a non-intervention policy regarding the use of rehabilitated housing for 
temporary accommodation (e.g. short rental destined for tourism), so as to attract further investment and 
expansion of activities in the area, in accordance with a global market perspective (chiefly tourism and 
real-estate).  
It should be noted that SRU strategy in large-scale partnership projects found strong opposition and the 
Cardosas project became the focus of counter-action, as the interviews demonstrate. Firstly, due to the 
high financial deficit of the SRU, it legitimated criticism of the society’s governance model, justifying the 
central state position of backing away from requalification policy implementation. This deficit also made 
apparent the appropriation of public investment by private interests, accompanied by widespread public 
criticism of the use of public money to fund high-end real-estate developments. Secondly, contestation of 
the planning and design of the project by academic and practitioner movements raised awareness of 
heritage protection. Thirdly, due to pressure from a boom in tourism activities, housing affordability has 
become a major issue for local populations hence a topic of political debate.  
What new elements does this case bring to our knowledge of gentrification processes?  
1. The effect of globalization and financialization was enhanced because local capital was low and a 
very profitable investment opportunity was available;  
2. Governance restructuring under a neoliberal model provided favourable conditions to the entry of 
market-led interests (such as a partnership model, lack of public scrutiny, and no coordination of 
goals between central and local authorities);  
3. The state made no effort to counterbalance these trends and actively supported them as a result 
of austerity.  
As emphasized by Pugalis, based on other neoliberal experiences (Pugalis, 2016), the SRU model 
provides a resignification of the concept that is inherent in requalification policy. Requalification that once 
focused upon the provision of decent housing for city centre populations, and in the 1990s to the provision 
of infrastructure and public amenities, paved the way in the 2000s for a more systematic market-led 
approach which in Portugal has been reinforced by neoliberal and austerity policies. The SRU model 
provided the governance instruments that made possible its implementation in the case of Porto, leading 
us to question whether, with good governance, the outcomes would have been different (Clark, 2014).  
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In this regard, we claim that measures could have be undertaken for the production and preservation of 
affordable housing, so that increases of rent would be limited and adapted to middle-class housing needs 
and demands. To do so, models of urban governance should be reviewed to ensure accountability 
regarding respect for policy guidelines across all stages of action (from strategy to project implementation), 
while the funding of public institutions, such as SRUs, should be designed to relieve dependence upon 
private investors and ensure that no public funding is used to increase profit in speculative operations, but 
to limit such profit.  
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ABSTRACT: The debate on urban interventions in central areas is probably one of the most controversial 
issues among architects and planners. Depending on how state and market act on the production of 
space, the development of certain urban areas occurs or their decay. In response to the decline process, 
the governments of several cities of the world have been developing urban policies of intervention in these 
central areas, basically in two ways: through their eradication, or through their rehabilitation. Recently the 
implementation of social housing policies has been defended as a strategy to cope with city centre decline. 
The aim of this paper is to analyse the case of São Paulo, Brazil. Over the last hundred and fifty years it 
has grown very quickly, presenting both rise and decline processes. Since the 1970s the municipality has 
been implementing several plans in order to revert the decline, and recently with the aim to provide social 
housing. The paper is divided into this abstract and four more sections. First a little historic appraisal of the 
public responses to the decline process, followed by a view on the rise and decline of São Paulo city 
centre. The next section will analyse the policies proposed and implemented by the municipality for the 
centre and then analyse the implementation of ZEIS 3, a type of inclusionary zoning, searching to 
understand it results in a rehabilitation process. This paper is partially result of a post-doctoral research 
project financed by FAPESP (São Paulo State Research Support Foundation), Process # 2015/26447-7.  
  
1 URBAN POLICIES FOR CENTRAL AREAS  
The debate on urban interventions in central areas is probably one of the most controversial issues among 
architects and planners. Since cities are socially constructed, they are constantly changing, growing or 
declining in response to changes in the societies in which they are embedded. Depending on how the 
state and the market interact on the production of space, the development of certain urban areas occurs, 
with the appearance of new economic activities and social classes, or their decay, with the end of these 
activities, economic decline and migration (Couch, 1990).  
In response to this process, the local authorities of several cities have been developing urban policies for 
intervention in these central areas basically in two ways (Nobre, 1994): the first would be its eradication, 
caused by the renovation of its built environment; the second would be its rehabilitation, through 
improvement projects.  
After World War II, the consolidation of Modern Urbanism and Architecture, following the modernist 
precepts of the CIAMs and the Athens Charter, led to the adoption of reconstruction policies based on the 
renewal of the urban fabric (OECD, 1983). The need to affirm the birth of a new period and the break with 
the painful recent past, technological development and capital inflow from the Marshall Plan allowed the 
reconstruction of several European cities, much influenced by Le Corbusier's ideas.  
The United States, despite not having suffered from the destruction of the war, also adopted the process of 
urban renewal in order to combat the process of “degradation” of the central areas (Rapkin, 1980). In order 
to eradicate the slums in these areas, generally residence of the poor afro-descendant population, the 
Federal Government established the Federal Housing Act in 1949, which provided federal resources for 
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